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HUD'S NEPA RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
ACT OF 1974: DELEGATION OR DEROGATION?
JAMES M. THOMAS*
The enactment of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 (CD Act) L, and adoption of new environmental review pro-
cedures by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), mark an important turning point in the life of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 Congress and HUD have both
expressed concern over the quality and protection of our environment.
The CD Act and HUD's new environmental review regulations (Reg-
ulations) 3 were intended to implement that concern.
One serious question which arises, however, is whether the delegation
of federal environmental responsibilities to the local level under sec-
tion 104 (h) of the CD Act' can be reconciled with NEPA's commit-
ment to federal accountability. This work will investigate the poten-
tial conflict by first examining whether the statutory goals of NEPA,
the CD Act, and the Regulations are compatible. Following a descrip-
tion of the mechanics of section 104 (h) and the Regulations, this Note
will then explore potential statutory interpretation problems. Finally,
a number of important national policy considerations, tempered by
technological and local fiscal realities, will be discussed.
* B.A., University of Washington, 1972; J.D. (expected), Washington Univer-
sity, 1976.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15,
20, 31, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1974)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)
(Pamphlet No. 5, 1975).
3. 24 C.F.R. pt. 58 (1975). HUD released additions and corrections to these
Regulations in July, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 29,992-98 (1975). Because no sub-
stantive changes were made, however, unless the specific section or subsection
referred to was affected, citations will be to 24 C.F.R. (1975).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h) (Supp. IV, 1974). See note 33 and accompanying
text inf ra.
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I. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PoLicY ACr or 1969
Since its enactment in 1969, NEPA has been bolstered with certain
"action-forcing" 5 procedures. These procedures were meant to inject
an affirmative duty into the decisionmaking process of each federal and
local agency to avert, or at least to minimize possible adverse environ-
mental effects resulting from "major Federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment."
The crux of NEPA's "action forcing" provisions is section 102 (2)
(C) .8 The detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) required
5. See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969).
6. For a discussion of why a local agency might be held to environmental obli-
gations under a federal statute see notes 96-125 and accompanying text infra.
7. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2) (C) (1970). The quoted language goes to the heart of NEPA, for a
project must be an action which is major, federal and significant in its environ-
mental effect for the Act to apply. In its guidelines for federal agencies the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has stated that when agencies are
considering what constitutes major action significantly affecting the environ-
ment, [they] should bear in mind that the effect of many Federal decisions
about a project or complex of projects can be individually limited but cumula-
tively considerable. This can occur when one or more agencies over a period
of years puts into a project individually minor but collectively major re-
sources, when one decision involving a limited amount of money is a prece-
dent for action in much larger cases or represents a decision in principle
about a future major course of action, or when several Government agencies
individually make decisions about partial aspects of a major action.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1975) (emphasis added). In defining a "Federal" action
the CEQ stated that there must be "sufficient Federal control and responsibility to
constitute 'Federal action' in contrast to cases where such Federal control and
responsibility are not present." Id. § 1500.6(c) (emphasis added). The term
"actions" has been defined as:
(1) Recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including
requests for appropriations....
(2) New and continuing projects and program activities: directly under-
taken by Federal agencies; or supported in whole or in part through Federal
contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding assistance (ex-
cept where such assistance is solely in the form of general revenue sharing
funds . . . with no Federal agency control over the subsequent use of such
funds);
(3) The making, modification, or establishment of regulations, rules, pro-
cedures, and policy.
Id. § 1500.5(a). In addition, to be "significant" an action must "[affect] the qual-
ity of the human environment either by directly affecting human beings or by in-
directly affecting human beings through adverse effects on the environment."
Id. § 1500.6(c).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970). See generally M. WARNER & E. PRESTON,
A Rnvixw OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES (1974)
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by that section serves three important purposes. Initially, the EIS per-
mits concerned citizens and courts to determine whether the agency
has considered the relevant environmental factors likely to be affected
by major federal action.9 There is no "precise formula" to determine
whether an agency has made an adequate evaluation of environmental
factors7O All that is required of the agency involved is a good faith
effort"i towards balancing the effect of the project on existing environ-
mental amenities against economic, social and technical considerations.12
Secondly, the EIS serves to make NEPA an environmental full dis-
closure law.' 3 To meet the full disclosure standard, NEPA requires
the responsible official to include a discussion of environmental effects
sufficient to enable a reasoned choice of alternatives to any proposed
major federal action.14 While the agency is not required to "foresee
the unforeseeable," it cannot shun consideration of alternatives merely
because some degree of forecasting is involved. 15 As long as the agency
(prepared for Office of Research and Dev., U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency); D'Amato & Baxter, The Impact of Impact Statements Upon Agency
Responsibility: A Prescriptive Analysis, 59 IowA L. Rav. 195 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d
849, 851 (8th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284 (1st Cir.), rev'g
sub nom. Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
10. E.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 61 (5th Cir. 1974). Nor is there
any requirement of unanimity among concerned parties on the desirability of
the action. See, e.g., Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973); Warm Springs Dam Task Force
v. Gribble, 378 F. Supp. 240, 244 (N.D. Cal.), application for stay granted, 417
U.S. 1301 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1974).
11. See, e.g., Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d
849, 851 (8th Cir. 1973); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 467 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973).
12. E.g., Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, Nos. 75-7061, 7092 (2d
Cir., July 24, 1975, as amended, Aug. 6. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Engr's, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 931 (1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See note 165 and accompanying text infra.
13. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1974); Schicht
v. Romney, 372 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
14. See e.g., Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d
849, 852 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973).
15. Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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takes a "hard look'"6 at environmental considerations, both adverse
and beneficial,17 it has fulfilled its statutory obligations."8
Lastly, the EIS preserves the integrity of the federal and local agency
decisionmaking process by thwarting any tendency to circumvent per-
sistent environmental problems or agency critics.19 Federal agencies
are required to make a good faith effort to solicit, review and comment
on responsible criticisms by other agencies or the public regarding the
proposed agency action.2 0 When these criticisms propose different
actions or present conflicting data or opinions, there must be a good
faith response.21 This interchange of environmental viewpoints is an
extremely important element of NEPA, and reflects Congressional in-
tent that environmental protection under NEPA should represent but
one of a number of integrated policies to which the country is deeply
committed.22
II. THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974
Another national policy is that of obtaining "a decent home and a
suitable living environment for every American family."23 The CD
Act, specifically Title I-Community Development (Title I), was de-
veloped to solve certain problems entrenched in the existing "workable
16. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
838 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440, 444 (W.D. Wis.
1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973).
17. See Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 427 (5th Cir.
1973).
18. See D'Amato & Baxter, supra note 8, at 199-200; Kross, Preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement, 44 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 81 (1972). See also
Greis, The Environmental Impact Statement: A Small Step Instead of a Giant
Leap, 5 URBAN LAw. 264 (1973).
19. See Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284 (1st Cir.), rev'g sub nom. Silva
v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (Ist Cir. 1973).
20. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9 (1975).
21. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284 (1st Cir.), rev'g sub nom. Silva v.
Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
22. See, e.g., Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1975), af'g 376 F.
Supp. 987 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (highways and the environment); Wilderness
Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. on other
grounds, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)
(Trans-Alaska Pipeline and the environment).
23. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 101(d) (3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 5301(d)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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program" requirements,24 and to eliminate bureaucratic second-guess-
ing by Washington.25 Congress intended Title I to streamline existing
grant procedures and to expand the role and responsibility of local
governments in implementing new community development projects.26
The role of local government, however, was not intended to be un-
limited. Congress firmly rejected a general revenue sharing principle
of "no strings" attached for Title I grants.2 7 Instead, Congress adopted
the block grant approach28 with specific application- and eligibility 3
requirements to insure that federal funds would achieve national, as
well as local objectives.31 The next sections of this Note initially will
examine the requirements of section 104 (h) of the Act and the Regu-
lations, and will follow with discussions of possible ramifications of
such requirements.
24. See 120 CONG. REc. H 5364 (daily ed. June 20, 1974) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Frenzel). Under the workable program requirements localities receiving
federal funding were to conform local urban policies with priorities set by federal
officials. Since the federal officials held the purse strings, and since federal and
local officials' classifications of priorities were not always harmonious, friction was
an unfortunate consequence. As a result many of HUD's programs were more
frustrated than successful. See generally Catz, Historical and Political Background
of Federal Public Housing Programs, 50 N.D.L. REv. 25 (1973); Hirshen &
LeGates, Neglected Dimensions in Low-Income Housing and Development Pro-
grams, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 3 (1975); LeGates, Can the Federal Welfare Bureauc-
racies Control Their Programs: The Case of HUD and Urban Renewal, 5
URBAN LAW. 228 (1973); Mandelker, Urban Conflict in Urban Renewal: The
Milwaukee CRP Experience, L. & Soc. ORDER 635 (1971).
25. S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56 (1974).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 55; cf. Ely v. Velde (Ely I1), 497 F.2d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 1974),
rev'g 363 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973).
28. The Title I block grants replace ten prior development programs: the
Public Facilities Loan Program; the Open Space Program; the Planning Advance
Program; the Water-Sewer, Neighborhood Facilities and Advanced Land Acquisi-
tion Programs; the Urban Renewal, Code Enforcement and Neighborhood De-
velopment Programs; and the Model Cities Program. S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong.,
2d. Sess. 48-49 (1974). See generally Garrison, Community Development Block
Grants: A Whole New Ball Game for City Hall, NATIoN's CrTIns, Nov. 1974, at 49.
29. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 5304
(Supp. IV, 1974).
30. Id. § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 5305.
31. S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1974).
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A. Section 104(h) and the Regulations
While various provisions of the CD Act demonstrate a general con-
cern for the environment,82 section 104 (h) specifically details HUD's
environmental responsibilities.3 This section was intended to develop
local government competence in making environmental reviews by
assigning HUD's environmental review responsibilities to the appli-
cant.3 4 The decentralization of environmental review was aimed at
augmenting, not diminishing, the national commitment to environ-
mental protection.-s
In implementing section 104 (h), HUD may provide for the release
of Title I funds for particular projects 8 to local applicants37 who
assume all of the NEPA responsibilities that would have fallen on
HUD prior to the passage of the CD Act. Before qualifying for re-
lease of the requested Title I funds, the application must meet all the
requirements and procedures set forth in section 104 (a) and the
Regulations. 8
Although the manner in which the applicant complies with the
Regulations is for the most part discretionary, certain procedures are
32. See, e.g., Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 §§ 101 (a),
104(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301(a), 5304(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
33. In order to assure that the policies of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 are most effectively implemented in connection with the expendi-
ture of funds under [Title I], and to assure to the public undiminished protec-
tion of the environment, the Secretary [of HUD], in lieu of the environmental
protection procedures otherwise applicable, may under regulations provide for
the release of funds for particular projects to applicants who assume all of the
responsibilities for environmental review, decisionmaking, and action pursuant
to [the CD Act] that would apply to the Secretary [of HUD] were he to
undertake such projects as Federal projects.
42 U.S.C. § 5304(h) (Supp. IV, 1974).
34. 120 CONG. Rnc. H 8432 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1974) (remarks of Representa-
tive Brown).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
36. Final HUD Reg. § 58.3, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,993-94 (1975). There are a num-
ber of activities which would qualify as Title I projects, i.e. the acquisition of real
property which is deemed by the applicant to be appropriate for rehabilitation; the
acquisition, construction, reconstruction or installation of public works; code en-
forcement; clearance, demolition or removal of buildings; removal of material and
architectural barriers which restrict the mobility of the elderly or handicapped.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 5305
(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
37. Final HUD Reg. § 570.3(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 24,694 (1975).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a) (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. § 58.1 (1975).
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required by HUD.39 Existing environmental conditions and current
trends likely to develop without the proposed project, as well as the na-
ture and magnitude of all environmental impacts of the project, must
be identified. 40 The applicant must then consider whether modifica-
tions or alternatives would minimize or avert any adverse environ-
mental impact.41 Finally, the applicant, independently of HUD, must
make an important "level of clearance" finding. Essentially, this finding
results in an applicant concluding that the project will or will not
significantly affect the quality of the human environment.4 2 If the
applicant decides that there will be no significant environmental im-
pact, it is not required to file an EIS with the Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ). Rather, the applicant must file a "Notice of
Finding of No Significant Effect on the Environment" with HUD.
4 S
Upon the filing of this notice and its release to the public, the appli-
cant has completed its environmental review. If the applicant's inde-
pendent level of clearance finding establishes that the project would
significantly affect the environment, an EIS is required.
44
39. 24 C.F.R. § 58.15 (1975).
40. Id. §§ 58.3, 58.15(a), (b).
41. Id. § 58.15(c).
42. The Regulations state that "the applicant must make one of the two level of
clearance findings . . .: (1) Finding that request for release of funds for project
is not an action which may significantly affect the quality of human environment.
. . . (2) Finding that request for release of funds for project is an action which
may significantly affect the quality of the human environment. . ." Id. §§
58.15(d)(1), (2).
43. Id. § 58.16. Now that HUD has consulted with CEQ and promulgated its
final Regulations, unless an EIS is filed by a Title I applicant, it will be HUD
and not CEQ who will be the ultimate environmental 'watchdog.' Formerly, CEQ
would have played a much more active role. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 600.65 (1974)
(HUD sponsored actions to be in full accord with NEPA); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(e)
(1974) (certain CEQ requirements still exist even though a "negative determina-
tion" was filed). Cf. 23 C.F.R. § 771.7(b) (1975) (negative declaration in
Federal Highway Administration environmental assessment procedures). For a
discussion of sharp criticism recently aimed at HUD's own environmental record
see note 141 infra.
44. 24 C.F.R. § 58.17 (1975); cf. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.7, .8 (1975). HUD has
established two threshhold requirements for projects definitely requiring an EIS:
any project which would remove, demolish, convert or emplace a total of five
hundred or more dwelling units, or any water and sewer facility project which
would serve under-developed areas of one hundred acres or more. 24 C.F.R.
§ 58.25 (1975). The danger implicit in setting such thresholds is that the ap-
plicant, regardless of the qualitative effects on the environment, may be encour-
aged to find no EIS is required for projects falling short of the quantitative line
HUD has drawn. Cf. notes 137-41, 165 and accompanying text infra.
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Upon completion of the environmental review and level of clearance
finding, and prior to the actual release of Title I funds, the applicant
must insure sufficient notification to the public. Such notification
must be made at least five days prior to actual application, and must
include publication of the applicant's intent to apply for funds as well
as a description of the project.49 The applicant is also required to
state that it has prepared a detailed environmental review record40 of
the project which may be examined by the public. In addition, the
applicant must consent to accept federal jurisdiction in any action
alleging flaws in its environmental review. 47 Finally, the publication
must contain a form certifying that HUD will accept objections to its
approval of the request for release of funds and the applicant's certifi-
cation48 of compliance with NEPA only on very limited grounds, and
only if such objection is received by HUD within fifteen days after
funds are requested.49
45. 24 C.F.R. § 58.30(a) (1975).
46. Id. § 58.11. See note 134 and accompanying text infra.
47. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 104(h) (3) (D) (ii),
42 U.S.C. § 5304(h)(3)(D)(ii) (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. § 58.30(a) (6)(1975); Final HUD Reg. § 570.303(e)(4), 40 Fed. Reg. 24,701 (1975). The
submission of the Title I applicant to federal jurisdiction may raise basic jurisdic-
tional problems. The first question that may arise is whether § 104(h) (3) (D) (ii)
of the CD Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h) (3) (D) (ii) (Supp. IV, 1974), was a suffi-
cient designation of federal jurisdiction. Was that section intended by the Senate
and House conferees to confer original jurisdiction on the federal courts for NEPA
questions relating to a Title I applicant's local activities? How otherwise would
"[p]ersons and agencies seeking redress in relation to environmental assessments,"
as described in the Regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 58.32(b) (1975), get into federal
court? Is this jurisdiction independent of the general jurisdictional provisions of
the United States Code (Title 28) ? If § 104(h) (3) (D) (ii) does not independ-
ently confer jurisdiction, could a party "seeking redress" obtain federal jurisdiction
on the theory that the claim "arises under" federal law within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1970)? Could it be argued that interpretations of the
HUD contract with the Title I applicant are governed by federal law and there-
fore, assuming the requisite $10,000 amount in controversy, the case "arises under"
federal law within 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)? In addition, would persons and
agencies "seeking redress," as third-party beneficiaries of the contract, be entitled,
absent diversity, to enforce its provisions? If HUD was deemed to have contracted
away its NEPA responsibilities, would it be possible for a party "seeking redress"
to bring suit against HUD under established principles of agency law? Such ques-
tions although beyond the scope of this Note must be considered in determining
whether NEPA compliance questions within the Title I framework will be subject
to scrutiny by the federal courts. Cf. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42
U.S.C.A. § 660 (Pamphlet No. 1, 1975).
48. See text at notes 50-51 infra.
49. 24 C.F.R. § 58.30(a)(6) (1975).
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After its intent to request Title I funds is published, the applicant
must submit the actual request for funds50 consisting of an identifica-
tion of the particular projects for which the Title I funds are requested
and a documentation of the amount of funds to be allocated to each
project. In addition, the applicant must submit a certification verify-
ing that it has fully carried out its NEPA responsibilities.5' The appli-
cant must describe the levels of all environmental clearances carried
out, - and specify the dates on which the opportunities for review,
comment or other action regarding the environmental clearances be-
gan and ended. The certification is to be attested to by the applicant's
chief executive officer, who consents to submit to federal jurisdiction
for judicial resolution of any alleged breach of environmental duties.53
Upon its approval of the certification, HUD has satisfied its NEPA
responsibilities insofar as these responsibilities relate to the application
and release of Title I funds/' Since HUD considers that all its NEPA
responsibilities pertaining to Title I projects cease at this point, it will
refuse to respond to inquiries or complaints relating to a project for
which certification has been approved. Instead, HUD will merely for-
ward them to the applicant and its certifying officer.55 Thus, after
certification approval, the only recourse available to those dissatisfied
with local administrative environmental decisions is a suit for review
in the federal courts.
B. Section 104(h) and the Regulations in Practice
The goals of maintaining effective environmental management and
viable urban communities are not easily attained. Both goals are com-
plex and, as a result, are susceptible to a number of problem-solving
techniques. Thus, it is not unusual to find two governing bodies tak-
ing different approaches in their attempt to deal with problems arising
from these goals.
As a recent example of such an attempt, the United Nations has be-
gun advocating an "integrated global approach" to international en-
50. Id. § 58.30(b).
51. Id. § 58.30(c).
52. See text at notes 42-44 supra.
53. 24 C.F.R. § 58.30(c)(6) (1975). But see note 47 supra.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
55. 24 C.F.R. § 58.32 (1975).
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vironmental problems.56 At the same time, Congress has moved to
narrow direct federal involvement in local problems such as blight and
community development by allowing greater local autonomy in de-
cisionmaking.57 These moves need not conflict in a philosophical
sense as long as they are kept separate. The question arises, however,
whether it is feasible to infuse a single statutory provision with broad
environmental concern,58 while at the same time emphasizing that the
governmental body responsible for its implementation shall be rela-
tively unimpeded in its pursuit of local priorities. 9
1. The Pre-CD Act Delegation Issue and the Courts
A crucial question regarding the operation of section 104 (h) is
whether its delegation of HUD's environmental responsibilities to the
local level has repealed or superseded NEPA.
Prior to the passage of the CD Act there were two well-defined views
on the delegation issue. The view that NEPA responsibilities are in-
capable of delegation was initially stated in Greene County Planning
Board v. Federal Power Commission.-° In Greene County, a local
power authority sought a construction license for three new power
lines. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) attempted to delegate
its responsibility for conducting an environmental review to the local
power authority.61 The Second Circuit invalidated this attempted
delegation on the ground that the local power authority, while re-
quired by the FPC to draw up and file an EIS, was the very party
applying for the license.62 The court, noting a dangerous inclination
56. The great potential for environmental degradation in one area resulting in
adverse environmental impacts on an international scale spurred the Governing
Council of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to develop an
Action Plan for the international environment. For a description of UNEP and
its six priority areas see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALTY-THE FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 427-53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CEQ FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT].
57. See text at notes 25-26 supra.
58. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 §§ 101 (a), (d) (3),
104(h) (1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301(a), (d)(3), 5304(h)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974); 24
C.F.I. § 58.1 (1975).
59. See 24 C.F.R. § 58.15 (1975).
60. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
61. Id. at 416.
62. Id. at 416-17.
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for the local power authority to base its EIS on "self-serving assump-
tions" ' given the FPC's lack of substantive participation in the formu-
lation of the EIS, held the attempted delegation to be a violation of
NEPA's mandate to consider environmental values at every important
stage of the administrative process.64
In Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary of
Transportation,cs the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), in
defending its delegation of NEPA responsibilities, attempted to dis-
tinguish Greene County. The EIS for the section of highway being
considered in Conservation Society was written and prepared by the
Vermont Department of Highways (VHD) without supervision by a
federal agency. Although the FHWA's cooperation with the local
agency during the preparation of the EIS was more substantial than
that of the FPC in Greene County, the FHWVA was not protected from
the charge of abdicating significant NEPA responsibilities.
The FHWvA argued that, unlike the local power authority in Greene
County, the VHD was in no sense an "applicant or contestant." 6
Further, without such a potential conflict of interest, the FHWA
argued, an), fear that the VHD would rely upon "self-serving assump-
tions" to prepare an EIS was unwarranted.6r The court did not agree.
Uncontroverted testimony by the Vermont Speaker of the House and
the VHD Commissioner established that the VHD was duty-bound to
follow the state legislative mandate regarding the building of high-
ways.-8 The inherent conflict between the state mandate to build high-
ways and the duty under NEPA to make an objective analysis of en-
vironmental considerations put Conservation Society squarely in point
63. Id. at 420. Cf. Kross, supra note 18, at 137.
64. 455 F.2d at 420-21. The Second Circuit was not alone in its stand on the
nondelegability of a federal agency's NEPA responsibilities. In Swain v. Brinegar,
517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'g 378 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ill. 1974), the
Seventh Circuit held that "the delegation [by the responsible federal agency] of
responsibility for researching and drafting the impact statement" to the Illinois
Department of Transportation was in "direct conflicet" with NEPA. Id. at 776.
See also Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 741 (D. Conn.
1972); Northside Tenants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 244, 248
(E.D. Wis. 1972).
65. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 630.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 631.
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with Greene County.69 As a result, the Conservation Society court in-
validated the attempted delegation.70
The majority view on the delegation question, which was just re-
cently incorporated into NEPA, distinguishes Conservation Society and
Greene County in situations where the federal agency has delegated
some but not all its NEPA responsibilities.- Courts have interpreted
section 102 of NEPA72 as calling for good faith objectivity rather than
subjective impartiality.73 Neither the commitment of funds nor the
EIS are deemed to be fatally contaminated, as a matter of law, because
of direct involvement by a financially interested party,74 state agency,75
69. Id.
70. Id. at 632. Informal discussions or visits of federal officials with the VHD
were not sufficient participation to meet the requirement of federal involvement
under NEPA. Id. Cf. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328, 335
(2d Cir. 1974), aff'g 360 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 1-291 Why? Ass'n v.
Bums, 372 F. Supp. 223, 243-44 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd 517 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir
1975). But see generally Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the
Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup dc Grace?, 72
CoLum. L. REv. 963 (1972).
71. See 121 CoNG. REc. H 2996-3001 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1975). After the
Conservation Society appeal was decided the Federal Highway Administrator
stopped all federal-aid highway construction in Connecticut, New York and Ver-
mont. The FHWA then backed legislation in the House which would have pro-
vided it with an exemption from all its environmental responsibilities. The House
rejected that solution, and severely criticized the FHWA for its maneuvering,
labelling it the "most uncooperative of Federal agencies" with regard to compli-
ance with NEPA. Id. at H 3000 (remarks of Representative Ottinger).
To sol.ve this problem the House adopted a two-pronged approach. First, it
proposed a bill (H.R. 3787, 94th Cong., ist Sess. (1975)) which provided that
any EIS drawn up by a state highway department in any of the three states would
be deemed to be an EIS prepared by the Secretary of Transportation for NEPA
purposes. Id. Next, another bill was proposed (H.R. 3130, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1975)) to amend NEPA. This bill provided that an EIS will not be deemed
legally insufficient merely because it was prepared by a state agency if the re-
sponsible federal agency actively participates, and makes an independent evalua-
tion of the EIS prior to its approval. Id. at H 3001. The bills were consolidated
and after revisions were approved by both houses, H.R. 3130 was signed into law
by the President. Id. at H 8201 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1975).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (D) (Pam-
phlet No. 5, 1975).
73. See, e.g., Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 467 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467
(5th Cir. 1973).
74. Life of the Land v. Brinegar 485 F.2d 460, 467 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1052 (1973).
75. See, e.g., Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d
849, 854-55 (8th Cir. 1973); note 71 supra.
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or new comnunity7r in the environmental review process. Abdication
of a significant part of the particular federal agency's NEPA responsi-
bilities, however, is forbidden.rr Courts adopting this view of the dele-
gation issue have repeatedly held that NEPA's requirement of giving
appropriate consideration to environmental amenities and values7M in
the preparation and drafting process will not be satisfied by a "rubber
stamp"79 approval of a proposed major action without significant
federal participation. so
2. NEPA Superseded or Supported?
In HUD's view, the passage of the CD Act eliminated the delegation
controversy regarding any applicant with legal capacitys' to assume
HUD's NEPA responsibilities. While it is apparent that HUD's inter-
pretation of the CD Act is not in complete harmony with prior judicial
interpretations of a federal agency's duties under NEPA, HUD officials
maintain that the CD Act supports and does not supersede NEPA.8 2
Evidence in the legislative history, however, may indicate that section
104 (h) could be read to amend or repeal NEPA by implication. 3
76. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974).
77. 121 CoNo. Rzc. H 2001 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1975). See, e.g., Life of the
Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973).
78. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2) (B), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(B) (1970).
79. Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 279 (W.D. Wash. 1972), afT'd, 487
F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1973).
80. See, e.g., Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 880(D Ore. 1971) (HUD approval of a local group's environmental worksheet three
days after it was submitted failed to show federal agency had lived up to its NEPA
responsibilities).
81. 24 C.F.R. § 58.5(b)(1) (1975); see 40 Fed. Reg. 1392 (1975). An appli-
cant having "legal capacity" is vaguely defined as one having the capacity to as-
sume and carry out NEPA responsibilities, with the only limitation being that
"[c]ommunity associations (other than public entities which are also community
associations)," and certain private developers are deemed to lack "legal capacity"
for environmental review. 24 C.F.R. § 58.5(b) (2) (1975).
82. Interview with Walter L. Eschbach, HUD Environmental Clearance Officer
for St. Louis, in St. Louis, Jan. 28, 1975.
83. See text at notes 25 & 34 supra. In opposing the inclusion of section
104(h), Senator Henry Jackson, Chairman of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs and author of NEPA, argued that at worst it would provide HUD
with total immunity from any responsibility to prepare an EIS, and at best §
104(h) would serve only to inject through legislative action an additional element
of uncertainty in the administration of NEPA. 120 CONG. REc. S 14,884 (daily
ed. Aug. 13, 1974).
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The issue of whether NEPA was intended to repeal any existing
laws by implication was recently considered by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP).84 The nation's railroads petitioned the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) for rate increases under a statutory provision al-
lowing emergency rate increases for nearly all existing freight rates.
Plaintiffs asserted that NEPA repealed by implication the prior statu-
tory provision which would have enabled the ICC to grant the rail-
roads' petition without filing an EIS. The court rejected this conten-
tion and held that NEPA's language85 made it clear that it was not
intended to repeal by implication any earlier statutes.8
By analogy, an argument can be made that the language of the CD
'Act, like that of NEPA, does not repeal other statutes by implication.
The main purpose of section 104(h)(1) is to ensure that the policies
of NEPA "are most effectively implemented."87  Although section
104(h)(l) then proceeds to authorize HUD to delegate its NEPA
responsibilities to local applicants, it is arguable that section 104 (h)
(2) 88 limits this delegation by stating that HUD's approval of an
applicant's certification shall satisfy HUD's own NEPA responsibilities
only "insofar as these responsibilities relate to the applications and
releases of funds."8 9
Is it conceivable that Congress intended to allow delegation of en-
vironmental review responsibilities pertaining to the release of funds,
but not to the ultimate use of those funds?90 If section 104 (h) is in-
terpreted in light of prior sections, the argument that no full-scale
retreat from NEPA was intended is strengthened.0 ' Section 104 (d) 92
84. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
85. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 4335
(1970), which states that "[t]he policies and goals set forth in [NEPA] are supple-
mentary to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies."
86. 412 U.S. at 694. See, e.g., United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 102-03
(1964); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939); Jamieson v.
Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 28, 35 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
88. Id. § 5304(h) (2).
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Cf. text at notes 27-31 supra.
91. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 101(d) (4), 42
U.S.C. § 5301(d) (4) (Supp. IV, 1974), which states that one of the purposes of
Title I is to foster the "undertaking of housing and community development
activities in a coordinated and mutually supportive manner." This can be in-
terpreted to involve continued active federal participation.
92. Id. § 5304(d).
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seems to bolster this hypothesis. It requires that HUD at least on an
annual basis "make such reviews and audits as may be necessary or
appropriate to determine . . .whether that program conformed to the
requirements of this chapter and other applicable laws .... ". This
reading dearly strengthens the argument that HUD's NEPA responsi-
bilities do not cease with the release of funds, but continue to follow
those funds through their actual physical uses.
Employing the SCRAP logic,9 4 it would be anomalous if Congress
had provided that the federal agency which has the primary responsi-
bility for implementing the CD Act must simultaneously implement
the policies of both the CD Act and NEPA, while at the same time
providing that the courts may ignore the clear congressional require-
ment of ultimate federal accountability under NEPA.95
3. Do Federal Funds Ever Cease Being Federal?
The question of when federal funds cease being federal, or indeed
whether a federal agency has any NEPA obligations after releasing
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. 412 U.S. at 694. The author recognizes the irony in utilizing an argument
that previously defeated a broad NEPA interpretation in defending a broad NEPA
interpretation in this instance.
95. Cf. Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United States Postal Serv., 389 F. Supp.
1171 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975). The U.S. Postal Service
had planned to build a vehicle maintenance facility as part of a multi-story housing
project in Manhattan. The project was to occupy an entire city block. After the
Postal Service rejected a demand to abandon construction of the maintenance
facility plaintiffs brought suit claiming the Postal Service had violated NEPA
provisions. Id. at 1175. Plaintiffs alleged defendant's EIS bad failed to consider
the environmental impact of the housing, and had inadequately discussed feasible
alternatives. Defendant's major claim was that under 39 U.S.C. § 410 (1970),
the Postal Service was not subject to NEPA. 389 F. Supp. at 1176. The perti-
nent part of the statute stated that "no Federal law dealing with public or Federal
contracts, property, works, officers, employees, budgets, or funds,. . . shall apply to
the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service." Postal Reorganization Act §
410(a), 39 U.S.C. § 410(a) (1970).
The court's reading of the statute differed from that of the Postal Service. The
bench noted that the statute did not exempt defendant from all federal laws, but
only those concerned with "public or Federal contracts, property, works, officers,
employees, budgets, or funds .... ." 389 F. Supp. at 1178. Characterizing the
preceding as "words of limitation," while concurrently viewing NEPA as a
measure directed primarily toward environmental protection-not one dealing with
contracts, property, employees or funds per se-the court held that § 410 did not
prohibit or diminish the application of "such a broad expression of overriding
national policy as NEPA." Id. at 1178-79.
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funds to state or local agencies, remains unresolved. It has been argued
that the federal agency is merely the funding agency and does not plan,
construct or design the physical characteristics of the proposed proj-
ect.96 Some state or local agencies, in an effort to avoid the major
federal action label and its accompanying obligations,97 have alleged
that they made the "major" decisions under NEPA.1s This argument
has been rejected. 99 The determination of whether actions by federal
agencies are major federal actions within the broad purposes of
NEPA100 depends on whether the particular federal action serves as
the catalyst for the resulting environmental impact, irrespective of who
or what has actually caused the impact. 1° 1
Related to the issue of continuing federal agency responsibility fol-
lowing disbursement of federal funds are questions of state and local
obligations upon receipt of these funds. Courts have asserted that a
state or local agency should not enjoy the considerable benefits that
attend an option to request federal funds without also being held
accountable for the inherent federal statutory obligations.1 02
The problem remains, however, whether these inherent obligations
would cease upon transfer of funds under a Title I block grant ap-
96. Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D. Vt.
1973), aft'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
97. It is well established that state or local authorities have no inherent NEPA
responsibilities. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323,
327 (9th Cir. 1975); Biderman v. Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1146-47 (2d Cir.
1974); City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 596 (E.D. Mich.
1975); Tolman Laundry v. Washington, 6 ERC 1264, 1271 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1974).
98. Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp 627, 631 (D. Vt.
1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974). Cf. Ely v. Velde (Ely I), 451 F.2d
1130, 1133 (4th Cir.), rev'g 321 F. Supp 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971).
99. See cases cited note 98 supra. Cf. National Forest Preservation Group v.
Butz, 485 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1973), revzg 343 F. Supp. 696 (D. Mont.
1972). But cf. Kings County Economic Community Dev. Ass'n v. Hardin, 478
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1973).
100. See note 7 supra.
101. Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 14 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
102. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221, 227 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aft'd,
488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. California Highway Comm'n
v. La Raza Unida, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
The fact that enlistment by a state or local agency in a federal program offer-
ing financial assistance is purely voluntary has we'ghed heavily in decisions hold-
ing the volunteer to compliance with any applicable federal statutes or regulations.
Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1028 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933
(1972); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 12 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
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proach.10  The issues in Ely v. Velde104 (Ely 1) regarding block grants
administered by the Law Enforcement Administration Agency (LEAA)
are directly related to this problem. Plaintiffs there sought an injunc-
tion to halt the proposed federal funding and construction of a state
prison hospital in their neighborhood. They alleged that LEAA and
the state had violated NEPA by not preparing an EIS.10o Defendant
LEAA maintained it was prevented by its own governing statute, Title
I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968101 (Safe
Streets Act), from complying with NEPA,10 7 and that the basis of the
Safe Streets Act was a "hands off" policy approach for federal funding
to the states.' 0 ' Defendant also argued that since the NEPA require-
ment of federal agency compliance "to the fullest extent possible"109
was discretionary, while the Safe Streets Act requirements were non-
discretionary, the latter controlled. 10
The court rejected defendant's "hands off" argument. The congres-
sional intent in the Safe Streets Act, as interpreted by the court, was to
give the states more latitude in the spending of federal money while,
avoiding federalization of state and local law enforcement agencies.",
The court refused to read the congressional response to the problem
of protecting local police autonomy as necessarily including a retreat
by Congress from the preservation of other societal values-namely, the
protection of the environment." 2 The court also rejected defendant's
allegation that provisions of the Safe Streets Act and of NEPA were
irreconcilable, reasoning that the proper approach was to look to the
103. Cf. Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.N.C. 1975); 40
C F.R. § 1500.5(a) (2) (1975).
104. 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir.), rev'g 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971).
105. Id. at 1132
106. 42 U.S.C. § 3701 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
107 451 F.2d at 1133. The Safe Streets Act provided that LEAA was per-
mitted to make grants to a state agency if that agency filed an approved compre-
hensive plan with LEAA. 42 U.SC. § 3733 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1974). Under the statute defendant was able to withhold funds only if there
had been a "substantial failure" of the applicant to comply with certain explicit
provisions. 451 F.2d at 1133.
108. 451 F.2d at 1135.
109. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. . 4332(2)(D) (Pamphlet No. 5, 1975).
110. 451 F.2dat 1134.
111. Id. at 1136.
112. Id.
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underlying purposes of each act, thereby allowing both statutes to
operate if at all possible.113 The court determined that compliance
with NEPA would not undercut the "sought-after efficiency" of local
applicants,14 and thus required defendant to file an EIS.115
The purposes of Title I of the CD Act and those of the Safe Streets
Act (litigated in Ely 1) are substantially similar. Both acts, by use of
the block grant approach, combine maximum local determination of
how the federal allocation will be spent with minimal federal review
of the local decision. Just as the concern of Congress in passing the
Safe Streets Act was to avoid the inadvertent creation of a federal
police force,"16 the concern of Congress in passing the CD Act was to
"reduce significantly the unnecessary 'second-guessing by Washing-
ton' "117 that had been criticized under prior programs.118 Yet the
remaining "second-guessing by Washington" in housing and commun-
ity development must be interpreted in light of HUD's requirements
that the applicant coordinate its plans with the policies, standards and
regulations of other federal and state laws.110 Thus it is clear that the
otherwise unfettered nature of LEAA or HUD Title I block grants
will not exempt full federal participation under NEPA.120
The question as to whether HUD will be able to avoid the result in
Ely I may be conditioned on a judicial resolution of when federal
113. Id. at 1134-35. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Bedell, 506 F.2d 174, 188 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Fanning v. United Fruit Co., 355 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1966).
114. 451 F.2d at 1137.
115. Id. at 1139.
116. Id. at 1136 n.16.
117. S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56 (1974).
118. See notes 24-25 supra.
119. In addition to NEPA some laws with which a Title I project must be in
harmony are the Preservation of Historic and Archaeological Data Act of 1974,
16 U.S.C. §§ 469-69c (Supp. IV, 1974); and the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. II, 1972). See, e.g., Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 § 104(d), 42 U.S.C. § 5304(d) (Supp.
IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. § 58.1(a)(3) (1975).
120. Compare Ely v. Velde (Ely II), 497 F.2d 252, 254 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'g
363 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973), with Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp.
1244, 1247-48 (M.D.N.C. 1975). Plaintiff in Carolina Action attempted to obtain
an injunction to stop a city and county from building a new county judicial build-
ing and city hall. It was alleged that even though the funds for the proposed
project came from general federal revenue-sharing monies, the Secretary of the
Treasury was still obligated to file an EIS. Id. at 1245. The court rejected this
allegation, citing the distinction with regards to NEPA drawn in Ely 1I between
block grants and general revenue-sharing funds. Id. at 1247-48.
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funds cease being federal.121 At present any potential recipient of
federal funds may choose to withdraw from the federally funded pro-
gram rather than comply with NEPA122 A potential recipient, how-
ever, may not feign withdrawal by making a mere shift in funds or a
bookkeeping adjustment to avoid the requirements of NEPA, while
retaining the federal funds initially allocated for its projectJ23
A question remains, however, whether a project may be deemed at
some point to have progressed to the stage that withdrawal can no
longer be permitted. In one instance, in which many people had been
"encouraged" to leave an area forecasted to be included in the route
of a proposed highway, the court held "withdrawal must be clear and
unambiguous and prior to causing significant harm either to those who
might be displaced by the project or to the environment .... "124 In
another instance, however, emphasis was placed on the optional nature
of a state's request for federal funding, which was deemed to be open
"virtually until the concrete is poured." Withdrawal from a federally
funded project under this latter view would not be restricted merely
because the alternative use of state funds might result in an imperfect
consideration of the environmental impacts. 25
121. If HUD's position that after certification approval its NEPA responsibilities
are satisfied is accepted by the courts, does the Title I money released by HUD
then become state money? This issue has never been litigated.
122. See Ely v. Velde (Ely 11), 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'g 363 F.
Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973); Named Individual Members of the San Antonio
Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Citizens for Balanced Environmental Transp., Inc.
v. Volpe, 376 F. Supp. 806 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1974).
123. Ely v. Velde (Ely I1), 497 F.2d 252, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'g 363
F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973); Named Individual Members of the San Antonio
Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1028 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
Although it may be impossible after withdrawal to prove that the shift and
subsequent retention of allocated federal funds released state funds for the same
project, because the state retained federal funds, obtained on the premise of compli-
ance with federal environmental standards, it must either return all federal funds
so obtained, or be held to compliance with federal law. Ely v. Velde (Ely 11),
497 F.2d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'g 363 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973).
124. La Raza Unida v. Volpe (La Raza I1), 488 F.2d 559, 563 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied sub nom. California Comnm'n v. La Raza Unida, 417 U.S.
968 (1974).
125. Citizens for Balanced Environment and Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 376 F.
Supp. 806, 813 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1974). Cf. Homeowners
Emergency Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 388 F. Supp. 971, 974-75 (C.D.
Cal. 1974).
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. A Question of Maturity
A key to the implementation of section 104 (h) is the "environ-
mental maturity" of the applicants. The requirement that the appli-
cant possess both the legal capacity 26 plus actual ability to carry out
environmental reviews could prove to be a major stumbling block for
the use of Title I funds. Despite a curious statement by the Chairman
of CEQ that the increased ability of localities to undertake environ-
mental review was a "very significant development in recent years,"' 21
there is substantial evidence to the contrary. 28
By disclaiming further responsibility after disbursement of federal
funds, HUD apparently has intended a complete departure from the
NEPA arena, leaving little substantive parting environmental advice
126. See 24 C.F.R. § 58.5 (1975). A criticism of this provision is that it con-
tains a rebuttable presumption that the applicant has the capacity to conduct
effective environmental reviews, rather than having a rebuttable presumption that
the applicant does not have the capacity.
127. 120 CONG. Rnc. S 14,888 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974).
128. S. CARTER, M. FRosT, C. RuBIN & L. SUMEK, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGE-
MENT AND LocAL GOVERNMENT (1974) (prepared for Office of Research and Dev.,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter cited as CARTER]. EPA
surveyed local government officials in medium to large size cities and counties.
The officials were asked for their interpretation of the word "environment." The
officials were given a choice of four definitions, and failed to reach a consensus on
any one. Id. at 2. Furthermore, barely 30% of the nation's cities and counties
responding to the survey had formal requirements for an EIS. Id. at 6. Exclud-
ing cities in California, the national percentage of cities requiring an EIS is only
17%. Id. at 47.
A quick canvass of the problems that city and county officials labeled as their
major obstacles to environmental management brings to view nearly the whole
spectrum of urban riddles. The key obstacle to environmental management, as
viewed by the officials, was inadequate finances. Nearly 75% of the cities and
over two-thirds of the counties named lack of finances as their foremost obstacle.
Id. at 78;'N.Y. Times, May 30, 1975, at 1, col. 8; id., May 27, 1975, at 14, cols.
5-8. See generally Glendening, Municipal Finances: Change and Continuity, 6
URBAN DATA SERv. No. 12 (1974).
A substantial number of officials labeled lack of expertise, fragmentation of re-
sponsibility between levels of government, insufficient enabling legislation, inade-
quate methods to measure problems, and an absence of technology as other major
obstacles. CARTER, supra, at 78-80. This multitude of unsolved problems ex-
plains in part why just over half of those cities using an EIS felt it was effective.
Id. at 174. But cf. Bowie, Maryland Comm'n for Environmental Quality, The
Role of Environmental Impact Statements in Local Government Decision Making,
6 URBAN LAW. 95 (1974); Henry, A Local Government Administrator's View of
Environmental Management, in MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT 57 (1973) (Office
of Research and Dev., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
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for local officials.129 While HUD has offered to help the local appli-
cants establish environmental review systems, it has done so only with
the understanding that HUD "will not become involved in those sys-
tems." 30 The situation is particularly tenuous since the important
decision of whether an EIS is required, and the process leading to that
decision, is left "largely within the discretion of the applicant."' 131
Although courts have ruled that the degree of applicant discretion
allowed in environmental reviews is not unlimited,132 it is well estab-
lished that such discretionary decisions will not be reversed simply
because the court would have attached different weights to the com-
peting interests considered1?3 Whether applicants will be able to de-
fend their discretionary decisions from charges of arbitrariness, how-
ever, remains to be seen.
At first glance the provision in the Regulations calling for the prepa-
ration and maintenance of a detailed Environmental Review Recordl 4
(ERR) seems to be a welcome addition to the area of discretionary
applicant decisionmaking, an area too often plagued with unsub-
stantiated, dubious reasoning.-o If this section were to operate at an
environmentally effective level it could serve as an ever present check
on an applicant's compliance with NEPA to "the fullest extent pos-
129. See 24 C.F.R. § 58.1(a) (2) 1975.
130. HUD Memorandum on Environmental Review Procedures from Walter
L. Eschbach, Environmental Clearance Officer for St. Louis, Dec. 23, 1974, at 2
(supplementary information for Community Development Workshop) (on file with
Urban Law Annual).
131. 24 C.F.R. §§ 58.5(d), 58.15 (1975).
132. See, e.g., Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502,
510 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d
1244, 1249 (10th Cir.), rev'g 359 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Wyo. 1973); Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See
generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1973); Leventhal, Environmental De-
cisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 509 (1974).
133. See, e.g., Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402, 408 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
134. Essentially, the ERR calls for the preparation and maintenance by the
applicant of a detailed written account of each step in the environmental review
process, and is to be available for review on request. Among other things, the
ERR must (1) include a description of the project, (2) have documented proof
that each step in the environmental review process has been made, and (3) be
able to support the level of clearance finding that was made. See 24 C.F.R. §
58.11 (1975).
135. A good example of such dubious reasoning by an administrative agency is
contained in a Draft EIS submitted by a highway department. The Draft EIS
states, "Just as the old wagon road over Snoqualmie Pass was reclaimed by nature
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sible."136 The ERR, nevertheless, will prove to be only as effective in its
NEPA "watchdog" role as those who are using it want it to be.
Despite judicial warning against mechanical compliance with
NEPA,137 there seems to be an unfortunate tendency on the part of
agencies to permit participation in environmental reviews to become a
kind of "bureaucratic gamesmanship," wherein more emphasis is
placed on molding an EIS to fit the contours of a predetermined pro-
gram and to withstand judicial review, than is put on composing a
project in harmony with environmental needs.1 8 An ERR could be a
valuable environmental tool if put into the right hands. Yet, given the
current state of environmental reviews on the local level 2 0 and evi-
dence of an inclination on the local level toward environmental eva-
sion,-1 0 applicants for Title I funds hardly seem to be the proper hands
for such a tool.""
in less than 100 years, so also would this project revert back to nature in time,"
The project so described was a seven-lane concrete highway. Brooks v. Volpe, 350
F. Supp. 269, 278-79 & n.39 (W.D. Wash. 1972), aft'd, 487 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir.
1973).
136. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (D) (Pamphlet No. 5, 1975).
137. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
138. Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal
Bureaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511, 516 (1973).
139. See text at note 128 supra.
140. See, e.g., James River & Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond
Metropolitan Authority, 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.), aft'd mem., 481 F.2d 1280
(4th Cir. 1973). The Commissioner of the Virginia Highway Department testified
that "wherever possible in Virginia, federal funds are used on rural rather than
urban projects because there is likely to be more environmental controversy over
urban projects and the federal law requirements may thus be more difficult to
meet than they would be in a rural area." Id. at 631.
141. See Letter from East-West Gateway Coordinating Council to HUD, Nov.
8, 1974, on file with Urban Law Annual. To compound this problem, in a report
just submitted to Congress by the Comptroller General, HUD itself was severely
criticized for its failure to initiate and put into action "an adequate program for
assessing the environmental impacts of projects proposed for its approval."
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT EFFORTS FOR PROPOSED
PROJECTS HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE-DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT 37 (1975). In a survey of five HUD field offices the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) reported that in the span of only 19 months the offices
had approved:
-114 projects, or 45 percent, without ever preparing any type of environ-
mental clearance.
-20 projects, or 8 percent, before preparing required clearances, and
-5 projects, or 2 percent, after preparing only normal clearances rather than
the required special clearances.
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B. A Question of Economics
One great concern to local agencies is the economics involved in
Id. at 9. In sum, the five offices had followed required procedures for environ-
mental clearances in only 36% of the total projects. Id.
The failure of these five offices to be environmentally responsible was not an
isolated incident, but seems to exemplify HUD's whole attitude toward compliance
with NEPA. HUD has recently stated:
HUD rejects the premise fervently held in some quarters that the consci-
entiousness of environmental protection can be measured by the number of
.environmental impact statements (EIS's) produced by an agency. HUD
has limited manpower for its workload, and we consider an EIS in associa-
tion with a project proposal that ultimately will be rejected to be a waste of
scarce manpower. We prefer to disapprove the environmentally unsound
projects well before they reach the EIS stage, or to have modified them along
environmentally acceptable lines to carry out the spirit of NEPA without an
EIS review.
Id. at 41. As a statistical corroboration of HUD's philosophy, figures show that of
an estimated 30,000 project proposals requiring environmental clearances processed
by HUD over nearly a five-year span, only 81 were deemed to be "major Federal
actions" and thus requiring an EIS. Even allowing for the fact that some of the
30,000 were quite small, such an environmental record was far from laudatory,
and prompted a response from CEQ which stated the belief that "a much larger
percentage" of EIS's should have been prepared. Id. at 11. Criticisms of HUD's
environmental inadequacies have not emanated from strictly environmentally
oriented agencies, instead serious criticism has come from a wide assortment of
federal, state and local agencies, such as the Advisory Council on Historic Preser-
vation, the National Park Service, the Virginia State Water Control Board, the
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Texas Air Control
Board, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia,
and the Southeastern Virginia Planning District Commission. Id. at 17, 25, 26.
See also 5 ENVIRONMENTAL RPTR. CURRENT DEV. 1199-1202 (1974).
The GAO Report continues by pointing out what GAO left were the three
major contributing factors to HUD's environmental inadequacies, namely a lack of
priority and emphasis on environmental problems, inadequate guidance from top
HUD levels, and insufficient training for environmental clearance personnel.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra, at 31-35. In conclusion GAO stated:
HUD's view on the use of an [EIS] is not consistent with the spirit and in-
tent of NEPA and is one of the factors contributing to the weaknesses noted
in HUD's environmental clearance process. HUD's position strongly implies
that it believes---even before it knows all the facts which NEPA requires it to
obtain-that the projects it has determined should receive an [EIS] are en-
vironmentally sound. It implies that if critics raise questions or suggestions
that the project be rejected or modified, that these questions or criticisms can
be discounted because the HUD decisions are superior to these critics. This
philosophy was clearly evident on the [EIS's] we reviewed.
Id. at 42. To remedy this situation four recommendations were offered to HUD:
(1) that HUD raise the environmental function to as high an administrative level
as would be practical; (2) that HUD make an affirmative effort to make NEPA
compliance "an integral part of HUD's planning and decisionmaking process";
(3) that HUD make more efficient use in the actual environmental review process
of other federal, state and local "environmental expertise"; and (4) that HUD
establish a training program specifically aimed at assisting its environmental clear-
ance personnel in drafting more adequate EIS's. Id at 48.
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conducting an environmental review.142 HUD has offered applicants
up to ten percent of the Title I funds allocated to them in advance of
certification and application approval.13 These funds will be made
available for a number of pre-project planning activities, including the
planning and conduct of environmental reviews.144 Whether an appli-
cant already short of financial resources will feel disposed to sacrifice
ten'percent of its Title I allocation for what many cities and counties
view as an impotent procedure, however, is doubtful.240 Since litigation
under NEPA can consume large amounts of time and money,1 40 an ap-
plicant may decide that both would be better spent in the "manufac-
ture" of a comprehensive, yet superficial, ERR.14 7 Furthermore, the cost
of an EIS may greatly exceed the allotted ten percent advancement.1 48
In addition, after the initial environmental expenditure of the ten per-
cent, an applicant may decide to forego the use of federal funds and
withdraw its project from the Title I program. While this result
might be considered a financial loss, HUD views the expenditure as a
worthwhile gamble.14 9 On the other hand, the ten percent allotment
might be used as a probe to test public reaction to the project. If the
reaction proved adverse, the applicant would still be safe in with-
drawing from the Title I funding program. Because the only federal
money spent was the ten percent advance allocation, the project would
not be a major federal action. The applicant, however, could continue
the project to completion by using its own funds-thus avoiding NEPA.
If this were the case, then it certainly could be said the ten percent
was lost.
142. See CARTER, supra note 128, at 78.
143. Final HUD Reg. § 570.302, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,700 (1975).
144. 24 C.F.R. § 58.9 (1975).
145. See CARTER, supra note 128, at 174.
146. A recent environmental suit was stated to have consumed over 4,500
hours of the lawyers' time. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032
(D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub noma. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240 (1975).
147. Compare Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 426 (5th
Cir. 1973), with Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877,
880 (D. Ore. 1971). See also Arizona Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 483 F.2d
1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
148. Recent GAO studies have shown that some federal agency EIS's cost as
much as $150,000 to $250,000. 5 ENVIRONMENT RPTR. CURRENT DEV. 260 (1974).
149. Interview with Walter L. Eschbach, HUD Environmental Clearance Oficer
for St. Louis, in St. Louis, Feb. 4, 1975.
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C. Retreat from Federal Accountability
The significance of the passage of the CD Act to NEPA must be
viewed in conjunction with other current developments in environ-
mental regulation. Acceptance of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 197210 and the adoption by the Federal Highway
Administrator of Certification Acceptance,' 51 for example, if taken
alone, offer only a hint of a general federal pullback in environmental
vigilance. With the enactment of section 104 (h) of the CD Act, the
retreat can no longer be disguised. 5 2
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 in
effect exempt nearly all of EPA's water pollution control activities
150. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II, 1972).
151. 39 Fed. Reg. 17,309 (1974). See generally Note, On the Road Again:
Certification Acceptance Forces NEPA to Adapt, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL L. RPR.
50023 (1974) [hereinafter cited as On the Road Again].
152. See 120 CONG. REc. S 14,883-89 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1974). Senator
Jackson warned that "last moment" inclusions in conference reports of provisions
exempting NEPA must be stopped. Id. at S 14,883. Neither the House nor the
Senate had seen § 104(h) prior to the report of the conference committee. By
strategically inserting the NEPA provision into the conference report, the backers
of § 104(h) were able to avoid having to go before the Senate Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee chaired by Senator Jackson. Such a move could hardly be
termed fortuitous. Senator Jackson stated that while he would not vote against the
entire CD Act because of § 104(h), he asserted that he would fight a similar
exemption in a mass transportation bill as reported by a House committee. Id. at
S 14,888-89. It may be noted that the provision of the transportation bill Jackson
opposed was conspicuously absent from that bill as passed. See National Mass
Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 § 103 (a), 49 U.S.C. § 1604 (Supp. IV,
1974), amending Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 § 5, 49 U.S.C. § 1604
(1970).
Further evidence of a general tendency toward relaxing environmental vigilance
can be seen in a number of other recent developments. See, e.g., Named In-
dividual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't,
496 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1974) (court resigned itself to accept a con-
gressional decision exempting an expressway from both NEPA and § 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act); Strohbehn, NEPA's Impact on Federal De-
cisionmaking: Examples of Noncompliance and Suggestions for Change, 4 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 93 (1974) (discussion of a number of federal detours from NEPA, specifically
describing the Prototype Oil Shale Leasing Program and the winter fuel shortage
of 1974); Note, The Trans-Alaska Pipeline and Strict Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 179 (1975) (discussion of possible ramifications of
congressional approval of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (Supp. III, 1973)); 10 URBAN L. ANN. 297 (1975) (examination of the
reasoning of a recent decision by Justice Rehnquist, Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975), which allows states in certain situa-
tions to grant individual variances from national ambient air quality standards).
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from NEPA's EIS requirements.15 3 Although the Certification Accep-
tance procedures 54 did not exempt the federal-aid highway system
from the preparation of an EIS, their similarity to the CD Act's section
104 (h) is unmistakable. Like the basic premise of section 104 (h),
the Certification Acceptance procedures for the federal-aid highway
system rest on the theory that "the State highway departments have
reached a degree of maturity such that they no longer need careful and
detailed scrutiny by the Federal Highway Administration."'' 6 FHWA,
while sharply reducing federal involvement,so stopped short of at-
tempting to renounce all its NEPA responsibilities.'5 7
Apparently, proponents of section 104 (h) in Congress felt that the
step from FHWA's Certification Acceptance to their own creation was
a small one. In terms of NEPA's requirement of federal accountability,
however, the two procedures are far apart. A primary purpose of
NEPA was "to restore public confidence in the Federal Government's
capacity to achieve important public purposes and objectives and at
153. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 511, 33
U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. II, 1972). The concern over the withdrawal of much of
NEPA's applicability to FWPCA centers around patterns of development.
"Development of residential and commercial areas in previously undeveloped
areas, or a change in intensity of development, may be viewed as a process of dis-
ruption and restoration of an ecological balance... If an ecosystem balance is
disrupted by the introduction of some new factor, a different ecosystem will be
generated involving a new balance consisting of changed species, composition,
interrelation, and function within the new environment." REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
CoP., THE CosTs OF SPRAwL-LITERATURE REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 10(1974) (prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality; the Office of Policy
Dev. and Research, U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.; and the Oflice of
Planning and Management, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). Recognizing
the potential effect of development, and that "[s]ewers and sewage treatment plants
are replacing highways as prime determinants of the location of development.. ."
leaves serious speculation as to whether removing NEPA from the FWPCA sphere
was proper. See CEQ FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 36. For a general
discussion of the NEPA aspects of the FWPCA, see Phillips, Developments in
Water Quality and Land Use Planning: Problems in the Application of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 10 URBAN L. ANN. 43, 94-100
(1975).
154. 23 C.F.R. pt. 640 (1975).
155. 39 Fed. Reg. 17,309 (1973).
156. 23 C.F.R. § 640.5(g) (1975).
157. Id. § 640.5(i). The long-range effects of the FHWA switch away from
step-by-step review and approval of each individual local project action to Certifi-
cation Acceptance, has yet to be seen. The immediate effects of the switch, never-
theless, have already served to blur state highway construction procedures, thereby
making it almost impossible to choose the best time in the decisionmaking process
to require an EIS. Note, On the Road Again, supra note 151, at 50030.
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the same time maintain and enhance the quality of the environ-
ment." ' 8  While FHWA stayed within the perimeter of NEPA,'52
section 104 (h), if allowed to operate under HUD's interpretation, will
mark a pronounced departure from the NEPA sphere of federal
accountability.6 0
There are two inherent environmental dangers involved in a deser-
tion of the NEPA concept of federal accountability. First, control over
the cumulative effects of scattered local projects will be eliminated.'U'
Second, a local applicant, unlike a federal agency, is under no obliga-
tion to answer to Congress or the President 162 for any of its discre-
tionary actions.1'3
The combination of these two dangers could result in the applicant
not only determining its own community development policy, but in-
deed, affecting interstate and possibly international environmental
policy.16 ' An applicant could decide in its discretion that a particular
158. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
159. See note 157 supra. For a recent indication of congressional interpretation
regarding FHWA's relationship to NEPA see note 71 supra. Although H.R. 3130
as passed amends NEPA, the bill specifically states that the amendment will
"not relieve the Federal official of his responsibilities for the scope, objectivity, and
content . . ." of the EIS. 121 CoN'G. REO. H 3001 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1975).
160. Compare 24 C.F.R. § 58.32 (1975), with 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1975).
161. An applicant in eastern Missouri, for example, will have enough trouble
preparing an adequate EIS for that area, let alone having to consider environ-
mental effects resulting from other applicants' projects in other parts of Missouri,
as well as in Illinois, Iowa or Kentucky. The fact that the local official in eastern
Missouri consented to the jurisdiction of the federal courts is hardly a solution to
environmental problems in Kentucky resulting from the cumulative effects of small
projects in Missouri, Iowa and Illinois. Cf. National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 § 102(2) (C) (iv), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2) (C) (iv) (1970) ; Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974 § 101 (d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 5301(d) (2) (Supp.
IV, 1974); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1975).
162. But cf., e.g., Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481
F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973), which held in part that a major federal action
under NEPA e.insts "not only when an agency proposes to build a facility itself, but
also whenever an agency makes a decision which permits action by other parties
which will affect the quality of the environment."
163. But cf. Molokai Homesteaders Cooperative Ass'n v. Morton, 356 F. Supp.
148, 151 (D. Hawaii 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1974).
164. See Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'g 378 F. Supp.
753 (S.D. Ill. 1974), where the court held:
[S]tate agencies simply are not in a position to evaluate environmental conse-
quences of a national or worldwide scope. To require them to do so is to
invite substantial duplication of effort and widely varying results. State agen-
cies quite properly look first to the interests of their own state; this is inherent
in the design of a federal union. And such agencies are subject to political
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multi-purpose urban renewal project, while admittedly entailing the
potential for considerable ecological damage and disturbance outside
its jurisdiction, involved sufficient off-setting local economic and social
benefits to justify approval.1 65 HUD's interpretation of section 104 (h)
would seem to tie congressional hands absent the initiation of sup-
plementary legislation. Neighborhood opposition standing alone would
not be determinative,66 nor would arguments challenging the appli-
cant's finding of alleged blight.167 The applicant need only allege that
while Congress may have expressed concern for protection of the natu-
ral environment, it has also articulated a strong national policy to
eliminate blight and slums and to prevent blighting influences.108 The
problem, then, is that the very language of the CD Act presupposes
that urban renewal has a beneficial, rather than a detrimental effect
on the urban environment?6 9 It has been stated that most environ-
mental problems are a matter of aesthetics, and that only the affluent
can afford aesthetics.170 Yet surely the bulldozing of an urban neigh-
borhood has just as much environmental impact as the construction
of a highway through a rural area. 1 Consideration of the environ-
pressures which can often make detached evaluation of their own projects
quite difficult. The result is that state drafted impact statements may slight
or completely ignore essential national concerns ....
Id. at 778; CEQ FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 399-400, 427-32.
165. Cf. Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'g 376 F.
Supp. 987 (W.D. Wash. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA,
502 F.2d 852, 854 (6th Cir. 1974); Citizens Against the Destruction of Napa v.
Lynn, 391 F. Supp. 1188, 1190-95 (N.D. Cal. 1975). See also Kings County
Economic Community Dev. Ass'n v. Hardin, 478 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1973).
166. See Citizens Against the Destruction of Napa v. Lynn, 391 F. Supp. 1188,
1190-95 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 16 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
167. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Lyons v. Camden, 48
N.J. 524, 226 A.2d 625 (1967).
168. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 101, 42 U.S.C. §
5301 (Supp. IV, 1974); cf. Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 277 (W.D. Wash.
1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1973).
169. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 101(b) (1), 42
U.S.C. § 5301(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974); Durchslag & Junger, HUD and the
Human Environment: A Preliminary Analysis of the Impact of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 Upon the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, 58 IowA L. REv. 805, 857 (1973).
170. See Hagman, NEPA's Progeny Inhabit the States-Were the Genes Defc-
tive?, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 3, 41 (1974).
171. Durchslag & Junger, supra note 169, at 858. See Trinity Episcopal School
Corp. v. Romney, Nos. 75-7061, 7092 (2d Cir., July 24, 1975); CEQ FiFTH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 12. Cf. James River and Kanawha Canal
Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 359 F. Supp. 611, 631 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd mem. 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973).
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mental impact, consequently, should not depend on a factor as unre-
lated as the economic status of those affected172
The retention by HUD of a significant NEPA role in local projects
would allow Congress and the President to maintain a check on appli-
cants who stray from desired national environmental goals. Without
this check, the major responsibility for protecting the environment will
have to be shouldered by intervenors,173 and, ultimately, by the courts. 74
172. Cf. Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16, 25 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
See generally M. KEGER, THE POVERTY OF PouCY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: A
WORKING PAPER (1969) (prepared for Center for Planning and Dev. Research &
Dept. of Landscape Architecture, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley); P. MARCUSE,
CONSERVATION FOR WHoM (1973) (prepared for School of Architecture and
Urban Planning, U.C.L.A.); A. SOLOMON, HOusING THE URBAN POOR 178-79
(1974); Lampman, What Does It Do for the Poor?-A New Test for National
Policy, 3- PuB. INTEREST 66 (1974).
173. Cf. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328, 336 (2d Cir.
1974), aff'g 360 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). For a discussion of attorney's
fees in environmental cases see Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Sew. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975); Rich v. City of Benicia, 7 ERC 1439 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1974).
174. It was HUD's opinion that passage of the CD Act shifted the responsi-
bility of overseeing a local agency's EIS to the federal courts. Interview with
Walter L. Eschbach, HUD Environmental Clearance Officer for St. Louis, in St.
Louis, Feb. 4, 1975.
A major aspect of the federal accountability issue disregarded by proponents of
§ 104(h) is that the inclusion of mandatory jurisdiction in the federal courts
misses the goal NEPA was intended to accomplish. The harm courts are concerned
with in alleged NEPA violation cases is not strictly harm to the environment, but
instead the failure of administrative decisionmakers to consider environmental
factors in the manner mandated by NEPA. Jones v. District of Columbia Redev.
Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Regardless of popular notions
that many federal, state and local administrative agencies are merely the bureau-
cratic puppets of those they regulate, it is through this arm of government that
Congress initially assigned the chore of environmental supervision. See Cramton
& Berg, supra note 138, at 534; LeGates, supra note 24, at 229.
Courts have acted to sustain the status quo where an indefensible administrative
decision has placed it in jeopardy. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1323 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn.
1973). In the final analysis, however, it is the administrative agency, acting
through "action forcing" procedures intended to facilitate public participation and
comment, that is to provide the initiative for necessary modifications of the status
quo. See Cramton & Berg, supra note 138, at 534. See generally Cramton, The
Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative
Process, 61 GEo. L.J. 525 (1972).
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D. A Broad v. Narrow Interpretation
of Section 104(h) and NEPA
If HUD retains its interpretation of section 104 (h), and its view is
not judicially accepted, the federal courts will have to determine at
what point after the initial application for Title I funds an EIS by
HUD could be required.'75 This determination could be made by
utilizing the tiered impact statement approach."70 This approach,
while allowing for a broad initial EIS, would call for the filing of
subsequent EIS's whenever "major individual actions ... have signifi-
cant environmental impacts not adequately evaluated"' 17 in the broad
initial statement required for all major federal actions.
Those who support HUD's withdrawal from any NEPA responsi-
bilities and who oppose the tiered impact statement approach may
argue that the approval of the application, request for funds, and the
certification called for in the Regulations7s delineate the only point
at which a major federal action takes place.179
If courts are to protect NEPA's primary purpose of coordinating the
disparate environmental policies of different federal agencies,180 how-
175. See 24 C.F.R. § 58.1(a) (2) 1975; text at note 183 infra.
176. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(d) (1) (1975); Anderson, The National Environ-
mental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 362-65 (1974); Note,
On the Road Again, supra note 151, at 50028-29.
177. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(d)(1) (1975) (emphasis added).
178. 24 C.F.R. § 58.30 (1975).
179. A similar argument was put forth in a recent decision involving municipal
dam construction. The city had begun to build the dam while its application for
federal assistance was pending. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction halting
construction until an EIS was filed by HUD. The court held that a preliminary
injunction was not warranted. The court distinguished the dam from a highway,
saying that whereas highway construction has a number of discrete stages, the
construction of the dam involved only one "major federal action," that being the
actual point the federal funds were allocated. Since funds had not yet been allo-
cated, the court not only found that there was no city-federal partnership, but
went on to hold there was no federal involvement at all. Homeowners Emergency
Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 388 F. Supp. 971, 974-75 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
This case might be distinguished from cases arising out of an application of a
tiered impact statement approach on the CD Act because of the specific statutory
descriptions of distinct stages involved in those activities eligible for Title I funds.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 105 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 5305 (a)
(Supp. IV, 1974).
180. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
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ever, NEPA must be broadly, not narrowly interpreted.181 Courts
should allow enough flexibility in the CD Act and NEPA to enable
both acts to function "to the fullest extent possible." 18 2 This goal
would be best accomplished by the tiered impact statement approach,
which would make continuing environmental review possible during
definite stages of development, such as acquisition of real property,
relocation of the inhabitants, clearance, demolition, removal of solid
waste, disposition of any real property acquired under Title I, and,
finally, actual construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation or installa-
tion of public works.183
CONCLUSION
NEPA need not be an all or nothing proposition. Champions of
NEPA are not prevented by their alliance to the cause of environ-
181. See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 375,
380 (D.C. Cir.), rev'g 359 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Wyo. 1973); Citizens Organized to
Defend Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520, 540 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
182. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 4332(2) (D) (Pamphlet No. 5, 1975).
183. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 105(a), 42
U.S.C. § 5305(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). A practical example of the tiered impact
statement approach might involve an initial broad EIS covering the release of
funds for the entire project. This in turn might be followed by a more specific
EIS dealing particularly with the effects relocation of the inhabitants would have
on low-income housing supply. Next, another EIS might take a "hard look" at the
adverse effects clearance or demolition might have on local noise and air quality
levels. The removal and disposal of solid waste might also be deemed a stage of
sufficient magnitude in that, without adequate attention in an EIS on the subject,
future development in the area might be hampered. In addition, an EIS might
be called for to examine whether or not undesirable increases in housing costs for
low-income residents, evictions or abandonment might result from a construction,
reconstruction or rehabilitation program. See Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City of Dallas,
as reported in Community Dev. Digest No. 11-16, Aug. 19, 1975, at 2. For an
example of an EIS by HUD in which this very approach would have been func-
tional and probably advisable if done by a local applicant see Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement, Rpt. No. HUD-R07-EIS-74-06D (May, 1974) (pre-
pared by St. Louis Area Office, Kansas City Regional Office, U.S. Dep't of
Housing and Urban Dev.) (impact on the environment of the proposed demo-
lition of the Pruitt-Igoe public housing complex in St. Louis). Cf., e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), which held that the
river basin in which the Corps of Engineers planned to build a dam could be
divided into three sub-basins. Each sub-basin was described as having "distinctive
hydrologic, geographic, demographic, environmental, economic and sociological
characteristics," and therefore was "an appropriate unit for a separate environ-
mental evaluation." Id. at 135. But see Robinswood Community Club v. Volpe,
506 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1974); Citizens Against the Destruction of Napa
v. Lynn, 391 F. Supp. 1188, 1193-95 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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mental protection from backing comprehensive legislation aimed at
solving other dilemmas faced by urban communities. NEPA was
meant to reconcile conflicts, not eliminate needed projects.184 The
question is, nevertheless, whether the CD Act will be construed in an
analogous manner.
Section 104 (h) may very well turn out to be the pivotal section for
Title I of the CD Act. Expenditures of Title I funds may rise or fall
depending upon how this section is eventually interpreted. 85 In light
of a slumping housing industrylso and the desperate need for aid to our
dying central cities, 8 7 it is unfortunate that HUD has taken the CD
184. See 120 CONG. REc. S 14,889 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974).
185. Over 70% of all the EIS's filed by HUD through the first quarter of
1974 would have bee nsubject to the procedures in § 104(h). Id. at S 14,884.
In addition, figures show that upwards of 80% of all city activities which would
have required a federally supervised EIS prior to the passage of the CD Act, will
now also fall under § 104(h). See CARTER, supra note 128, at 188. If these
procedures as implemented by local applicants fail to satisfy judicial standards for
an adequate EIS, the applicant will find itself tied up in litigation while 90% of
its allotted Title I funds remain beyond its reach. The most recent development
on this issue is a suit pending in Dallas, Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City of Dallas, as
reported in Community Dev. Digest, No. 11-16, Aug. 19, 1975. Plaintiffs there,
while challenging nearly every aspect of the procedures followed in the granting
of $4 million in Title I funds to Dallas, include an allegation that Dallas' filing
of a "Notice of Finding of No Significant Effect on the Environment" was a
breach of its NEPA responsibilities. The suit specifically charges that "plans to
expand a code enforcement and housing demolition and code violation removal
project will have numerous adverse effects" and therefore an EIS should be
filed. Id. at 1. While this suit is pending Dalas will not be able to receive more
than 10% of its $4 million grant.
The void left by HUD in the area of environmental reviews may not be filled
by the applicants for some time, leaving one to wonder whether much if any of the
CD Act Title I funds will be used in harmony with environmental considerations.
Unfortunately, it is not likely that the states will rush to fill the environmental void.
A recent survey shows that only Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, South Dakota,
Texas, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin have environmental measures that
approach being effective. 5 102 MONITOR, No. 5 at 15-23 (1975). See also
T. TRZYA, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REQUIREMENTS IN THE STATES: NEPA's
OFFSPRING, (1974) (prepared for Office of Research and Dev., U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency); Hagman, supra note 170.
186. See generally N. KEITH, POLITICS AND THE HOUSING CRISIS SINc 1930
(1973); 121 CONG. REC. E 1894-96 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1975) (remarks of
Representative Harrington).
187. See generally G. Sternlieb, The Abandoned Building as a Clue to the
Future of the American City, July 23, 1970 (testimony prepared for the
Senate Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Banking and Currency
Comm.); Moore, Livermore & Galand, Woodlawn: The Zone of Destruction, 30
PUB. INTEREST 41 (1973).
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Act as a mandate to assign the foregoing problems to a group of en-
vironmental neophytes.188
The goal of providing decent housing and maintaining viable urban
communities involves just as many perplexing dilemmas as that of pro-
viding and maintaining a quality environment. Perhaps this is the best
argument for allowing the CD Act and NEPA to operate conjunc-
tively, on a separate but equal basis.
Title I of the CD Act may represent an effort by Congress to stay
abreast of today's housing and tomorrow's environmental problems.
Congress' best intentions, however, may be for naught if self-interest
groups succeed in stymieing NEPA by promoting an overly localized
environmental cost-benefit analysis6 9 derived from a narrow interpre-
tation of section 104 (h).190 The magnitude of such a development,
although not immediately discernible, would be inescapable. A nar-
row interpretation could only result in cutting out the heart of urban
environmental review by setting the stage for the probable transforma-
tion of the EIS into a bureaucratic formality. If this were to occur,
the end of NEPA's effective life would surely be soon to follow.
188. "Considering HUD's lack of priority and emphasis on assessing the en-
vironmental impacts of projects which it approves, the Congress may wish to
question HUD during future hearings on how effectively the localities are carrying
out their responsibilities for environmental review of proposed projects." Coaip-
"rROLLLR GENERAL, supra note 141, at 49. After considering the state of en-
vironmental review on both the local level (under the potential Title I applicants)
and the federal level (under HUD) it seems the logical resolution of the problems
this Note has examined would be a transitional period during which HUD and
those eligible local entities interested in obtaining Title I funds would work to-
gether in developing thorough environmental review procedures fully within the
spirit of NEPA.
189. See text at note 165 supra.
190. See 24 C.F.R. § 58.32 (1975); text at notes 54-55 supra. For a discussion
of a broad interpretation, see text at notes 87-95, 180-183 supra.
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